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DAVID COLLINS*
ABSTRACT
This short article argues that the World Trade Organization
("WTO") should have a standing agency to conduct fact-finding in
order to correct evidentiary deficiencies in submissions by Mem-
bers to panels during dispute settlement. Such a mechanism will
compensate for both the incapacity to produce full disclosure on
the part of developing nations and the unwillingness to do so from
other Members due to strategic reasons or purposes of confidenti-
ality. It is suggested that such an investigatory mandate could fit
into the panel's existing right to seek information or within the
broad scope of powers granted tribunals in international law.
Separation between fact-finding and decision-making achieved by
a specialized fact-finding body would both ensure judicial imparti-
ality and promote legitimacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent WTO panel report on investigations relating to the
softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the United States1
demonstrates that international trade disputes are increasingly
turning upon conclusions drawn from a complex factual back-
ground and, as a result, the need for WTO panels to possess a
complete evidentiary record has never been clearer. As Matthias
Oesch wrote of WTO dispute settlement in 2003, "a wide investiga-
tive authority and the necessary technical and personnel means,
are prerequisites for a comprehensive and thorough panel exami-
nation of facts." 2 Despite this need, currently WTO panels cannot
* Lecturer, City University London Law School, BA, JD (Toronto), MSc, BCL
(Oxon) <david.collins@utoronto.ca>.
1 Panel Report, United States -Investigation of the International Trade Commis-
sion In Softwood Lumber From Canada, WT/DS277/RW (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
Softwood Lumber Investigation].
2 MATrHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 55
(2003).
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engage in de novo review of Members' factual submissions and
while parties to WTO disputes are required to tender all evidence
requested by the panels, they are often unable or unwilling to do
so. The problem could be alleviated by the implementation of a
dedicated fact-finding agency within the WTO to conduct investi-
gations in order to clarify existing facts as well as ascertain missing
information helpful to the rendering of judgment. Such an investi-
gative body would not make recommendations or draw conclu-
sions but instead gather the evidence requested by the panel at the
behest of the parties or of the panel itself on its own motion (propio
motu). The fact-finding body's role would therefore appear to be
remedial; it would step in to address inadequacies in the evidence
as submitted by the parties for the purpose of fully informed deci-
sion-making. The purpose of institutionalized fact-finding is thus
seen as supplemental to existing disclosure requirements or as a
last resort which would engender WTO proceedings, suffering
from deficient evidence, with crucial fairness and legitimacy. This
article will demonstrate the need for such an agency first, by fram-
ing a fact-finding mandate within the current evidentiary powers
of panels under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU") and second, by suggesting that a WTO fact-finding body
can fit within existing principles of international law which are ap-
plicable to the WNTO. This article will then discuss necessary limi-
tations on such an agency's role, evaluate associated benefits and
detriments, and conclude with an outline of the form that the fact-
finding body would take.
Before embarking on this analysis, a distinction must first be
drawn between a WTO panel reviewing information already be-
fore it, where the panel is limited to an "objective assessment" of
the facts as presented by the Member States, 3 and obtaining new
information to fill gaps in the evidentiary record. The former, it is
suggested, involves a direct challenge to the conclusions drawn by
the authorities of the Member States, and the latter, which is the fo-
cus of this article, involves an evaluation of the fullness of the in-
3 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) Art. 11 [hereinafter DSU]. A de novo standard which
would give the panels complete freedom to come to different conclusions on evi-
dence presented by authorities from within Member States was rejected by the
Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 117-18, WT/DS26/AB/R Gan. 16, 1998).
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formation tendered relative to what is needed for the panel to
properly arrive at its decision. The distinction is admittedly a sub-
tle one - questioning the facts themselves does cast into doubt
theories drawn from them-and may accordingly necessitate the
establishment of a stricter standard of review, a reform which will
not be discussed here, but has been addressed by others. 4 For the
purposes of this article reviewing conclusions and investigating into
omission (which does not involve review per se) will be treated as
separate fact-finding concepts.
2. THE RIGHT TO SEEK INFORMATION
It is necessary to begin with an examination of the current
scope of WTO panels to obtain evidence lacking from party sub-
missions. To achieve a more complete picture of evidence, panels
already have broad authority to seek information from the parties
themselves and elsewhere, as provided in Article 13 of the DSU:
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body which it
deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such
information or advice from any individual or body
within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the
authorities of that Member. A Member should respond
promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such in-
formation as the panel considers necessary and appro-
priate ....
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source
and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on cer-
tain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by
a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory re-
port in writing from an expert review group ....
4 For a detailed analysis of the standard of review see OESCH, supra note 2;
Lee D. Hamilton, US Antidumping Decisions and the WVTO Standard of Review: Def-
erence or Disregard?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 265 (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof
and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the Burden?, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L.
227, 242 (1998); Stefan Zleptnig, The Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of
Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority, 6 EUR.
INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2002), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/
article/erpeiopxx/p0090.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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Panels are entitled to request information from the parties and
to ask questions that panels deem relevant to an assessment of the
issues, irrespective of whether the complaining party has already
established a prima facie case.5 Article 13 has been viewed as es-
tablishing a duty to disclose information rather than a mere prefer-
ence and Members are expected to approach the DSU in good
faith.6 Joost Pauwelyn has observed that the scope of the fact seek-
ing power conferred under Article 13 is so broad that it may in-
clude the right to "force the parties to a dispute to submit certain
information not yet on record," 7 which identifies the legitimate
concern that Members may be unwilling to produce all the evi-
dence that is requested. Indeed, the importance of a broad right to
seek information is illustrated by the failure of one of the parties to
provide the evidence required for a properly informed legal de-
termination. When the DSU was drafted it was assumed that the
requisite facts would be brought to the attention of panels through
the written and oral arguments of the Member nations.8 Unfortu-
nately this does not always occur.9 There is a tendency for gov-
ernments to ignore panel requests for facts.10 Parties might be un-
5 JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 543 (2002), referring to Appellate Body Report, Thailand -Anti Dump-
ing Duties on Angles Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from
Poland, 135, WT/DS122/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Re-
port, Thailand].
6 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, 187, WT/DS70/AB/RW (Aug. 2, 1999). [hereinafter Appellate Body Re-
port, Canada Aircraft]
7 Joost Pauweyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 325,329 (2002).
8 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 92 (1998).
9 Allegations of evidentiary shortcomings have been made by opposing par-
ties recently where new evidence subsequently modified the nature of party's
claims. See, e.g., Softwood Lumber Investigation, supra note 1; Panel Report, United
States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European
Communities, 7.67 - 7.71 WT/DS212/RW (Aug. 17, 2005). The adequacy factual
record presented by parties has also been questioned by GATT panels. See WTO,
GATT ACTIVITIES, 1994-1995: A REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE GATT IN 1994 AND
1995 50-51 (1996) (discussing two cases in which factual findings were ques-
tioned); Brazil -Imposition of Provisional and Definitional Countervailing Duties
on Milk Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Com-
munity, SCM/179 (Apr. 28, 1994) (illustrating Brazil's dissatisfaction with the
panel report's findings). See also, Gary Horlick & Peggy Clarke, Standards for Pan-
els Reviewing Anti-Dumping Determinations Under GATT and the WTO, in WTO AND
NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 296 (Garry Horlick ed., 2003).
10 See John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the VWTO -Access to the DSB System: Can
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willing to provide information because of a duty of confidentiality
to third parties or because they feel that the information is irrele-
vant and therefore could be prejudicial. This is particularly prob-
lematic in commercial defence proceedings because business con-
fidential information is often protected in domestic administrative
proceedings.11 The scope of a Member's responsibility to comply
with disclosure requests from panels remains clouded. For exam-
ple, it is unclear as to whether the obligation to produce informa-
tion extends to data in the possession of the Member at the time of
the request or whether it must also gather relevant information,
which may possibly be in possession of a private party. It has been
suggested that if it is reasonably within a Member's power to ob-
tain such information then it should do so.'
2
The Appellate Body has urged that the integrity of the WTO
dispute settlement process depends on the Panel's ability to induce
parties to a dispute to comply with their duty to provide necessary
information and that the failure of a party to do so may lead to ad-
verse inferences being drawn.13 Although panels have been hesi-
tant to draw adverse inferences against parties that do not provide
requested information that is within their possession, the Appellate
Body has clarified that Panels have the authority to do so.14 A re-
spondent's decision not to tender evidence on a particular issue
when the party has denied or refused to admit elements of the
claim does not prevent a panel from seeking info on that issue.
15
While an adverse inference may offer some assistance in arriving
upon a determination of fact, independent verification of evidence
through investigation would be infinitely more useful from the
the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker "World Trade Court"?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 739, 762 (2000) (discussing problems associated with document production in
DSB proceedings).
11 EDMUND VERMULST & FOLKURT GRAAFSMA, WTO DISPUTES: ANTI-DUMPING,
SUBSIDIES AND SAFEGUARDS 52 (2002). For additional commentary on the confiden-
tiality of WTO DSB proceedings, see DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
91-93 (2002) and ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 164
(2002).
12 WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 549.
13 Appellate Body Report, Canada Aircraft, supra note 6, at 204.
14 Panel Report, Indonesia -Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998). For additional commentary on adverse inferences, see
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS supra note 11, at 118-20.
15 Panel Report, Canada -Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
9.83, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada Aircraft].
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perspective of completeness and accuracy. In addition to the un-
willingness of Member States to tender all necessary evidence,
Members of developing nations may be incapable of providing a
complete factual record as requested because of resource limita-
tions. Finally, efforts to obtain information by one Member could
be frustrated by another Member.
In recognition of the need to rectify such factual deficiencies,
the Appellate Body stated that: "If... any party believes that all
the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason, not before
the panel, then that party should ask the panel in that case to en-
gage in additional fact-finding."16 This statement suggests that the
panel may be entitled to engage in investigation beyond that which
is outlined in DSU Article 11 in order to resolve omissions in a
party's factual submissions. A panel's broad based authority to
consult experts may support a wider interpretation of a panel's
powers with respect to evidence collection. Permanent groups of
experts are already established to provide technical advice to WTO
panels when needed under Article 24 the Subsidy Agreement, Ar-
ticle 18.2 of the Customs Valuation Agreement, and Article 8 of the
Textiles Agreement. Given the above noted breadth of scope of the
DSU, the need and possibly also the authority to allow a de novo
fact-finding function, as distinct from a de novo reviewing function,
for the panels is apparent. Less clear is the ability to extend this
authority to permit the procurement of additional facts without a
request from one of the parties-propio motu. However, such
power may fit into the even wider discretion available to tribunals
in international law.
3. FACT-FINDING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Third party fact-finding is well-entrenched in international law
and for this reason we should not be immediately disturbed by the
extension of this power in the WTO arena. Article 9 of the 1907
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes contem-
plated Commissions of Inquiry, the function of which was "to fa-
cilitate a solution of disputes by elucidating the facts by means of
an impartial and conscientious investigation." 17 Many modern
16 Appellate Body Panel Report, India- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, 94, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Appellate Body India -Patents].
17 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, (Hague
Convestion I), Oct. 18, 2007, Art. 9, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
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treaties provide for the establishment of fact-finding bodies. For
example, the 1982 United Nations ("UN") Convention on the Law
of the Sea makes provision for an inquiry whose findings of fact
are in most cases to be considered final by the parties to the dis-
pute.18 Article 5 of the European Economic Community Treaty
grants authority to the Commission to investigate potential treaty
violation. Similarly, international organizations have frequently
implemented fact-finding bodies to facilitate their decision-
making, such as the International Labor Organization which has
created commissions of inquiry on several occasions to assess
complaints relating to alleged violations of labor conventions.
19
The UN Security Council deployed a fact-finding mission in 1981
regarding the political unrest in the Seychelles. 20 The UN Secretary
General sent a fact-finding team to look into the Iran/Iraq war in
1987.21 The UN General Assembly's policy of fact-finding was em-
bodied in a 1992 Resolution and Declaration which encouraged the
use of such missions by UN organizations. This statement author-
ized the Security Council to conduct fact-finding without the con-
sent of the state in which they took place. 22
Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of analogy to WTO
dispute settlement, fact-finding is not without precedent in the ac-
tivities of international judicial bodies which have traditionally op-
erated without the restrictive rules of evidence seen in municipal
courts. Indeed, as Mojtaba Kazari has observed:
The liberalism of international law and the inherent flexibil-
ity of international procedure, too, naturally favour the au-
thority of international tribunals to investigate, propio motu,
the facts at issue. 2
3
avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm#art9 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, annex
VIII, art. 5(2), 21 I.L.M. 1261.
19 See generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT 56 (1998)
(explaining that a five-member Commission was used in determining the sum of
the liability owed by Chile in response to an explosion); Constitution of the Inter-
national Labour Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, art. 26, 62 Stat. 3532, 15 U.N.T.S. 18
(providing the establishment of fact-finding inquiries).
20 S.C. Res. 496, U.N. Doc. S/RES/496 (Sept. 1, 1981).
21 S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (Jan. 16, 1987).
22 G.A. Res. 46/59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/59 (Jan. 21, 1992).
23 MOJATBA KAZARI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED IsSUES: A STUDY OF
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 154 (1998).
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Examples of judicial fact-finding in international law are nu-
merous. It is extended to the European Court of Human Rights
under Article 40 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Tribunals established under the International Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes have the authority to conduct
investigations under Article 43 of the Convention. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") has an express entitlement to conduct
a site inspection to procure evidence under Article 44(2) of its Stat-
ute. This authority also belonged to its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ").24 Examples of fact-finding
in international law include the submission of questionnaires, pre-
hearing conferences, on-site inspection, summoning witnesses, and
judicial notice. 25
The prevalence of tribunals which have engaged in fact-finding
may suggest that the ability to do so does not require authorization
through statute or any other incorporating instrument, such as a
tribunal's rules of procedure, but rather is inherent. It may be
tempting to conclude that fact-finding is an established general
principle of law or a custom. Like any international tribunal, the
WTO panel has the implied jurisdiction to "interpret the submis-
sions of the parties" so as to "isolate the real issue in the case and
to identify the object of the claim." 26 The doctrine of implied pow-
ers requires that the implied power does not contradict the "essen-
tial nature of the organization" but enables it "to discharge the
functions laid upon it" by its constituent instrument27- in this case
the DSU. The procurement of facts is easily seen as an important
24 Although the PCIJ rules had been silent on the issue of fact-finding, au-
thority was found in a technical regulation which provided for the payment of
judge's expenses while travelling on duty to examine locations concerned in the
proceedings. See Manley Hudson, Visits By International Tribunals to Places Con-
cerned in the Proceedings, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 660, 696 (1937) (discussing the problem
of the Permanent Court of International Justice faced in visiting places in proceed-
ings).
25 See KAZARI, supra note 22, at 168-176. Waincymer has suggested that WTO
panels are already empowered to conduct site inspections. See WAINCYMER supra
note 5, at 544 ("While it would be rare for it to do so, a Panel could in theory make
a site inspection to procure evidence.").
26 Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 555 (2001). See also Nuclear Tests Case (Austl.
v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 259-60 (Dec. 20, 1974) (discussing the power of inherent ju-
risdiction of a court to ensure the exercise of its jurisdiction, provide for settle-
ments of disputes, and observe the inherent limitations of the judicial function).
27 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.) 1990 I.C.J. 18,
41-42 (Feb. 28, 1990) (J. Shahabuddeen, dissenting).
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aspect of the WTO's purpose to adjudicate trade disputes. Al-
though the WTO must be viewed as part of public international
law, the extent to which the fact-finding feature, as well as other
principles of international law, such as the doctrine of implied
powers, may be extended to what is essentially a bi-lateral, self-
contained regime is admittedly uncertain. However, the statement
in Article 3.2 of the DSU which specifies that WTO agreements
must be interpreted "in accordance with customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law" suggests that precedents in
international law, such as those involving fact-finding, may not
only offer guidance when evaluating the powers of WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (WTO "DSB"), but may actually inform any ex-
tensions thereof.28 In this regard it may also be significant that the
WTO agreements fail to explicitly mention that the panels do not
have a fact-finding mandate such that it cannot be asserted that
WTO Members have "contracted out" of the principles of interna-
tional law or even that there is any indication of conflict between
them in this area. Potential limitations on the panel's jurisdiction
to conduct factual investigation will now be considered.
4. LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING
Under a strict adversarial system, a fact-finding role for judges
in any tribunal raises concern that the impartiality and objectivity
of their rulings will be compromised. This is reflected, for exam-
ple, in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges which prohib-
its judges from actively participating in investigations. 29 But as the
foregoing section indicated, the WTO DSB should arguably be
viewed in light of the inquisitive model of adjudication common to
Civil Law systems such as Japan and Continental Europe and as
such may possess a more proactive role characterized by increased
emphasis on negotiation over litigation. 30 There is a further intui-
28 Pauwelyn, supra note 26, at 577.
29 A judge shall disqualify himself if he has "personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). For further
discussion of this topic see Ellen Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40
U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1991-92).
30 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: 'Americanization' and Negotiation
in Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 121, 139 (2003-04) (ex-
amining the 'Americanization' of the WTO); CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE,
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WTO 111-31 (2001) (analyzing the
structural flaws of the WTO as a result of the protests during the WTO meeting in
Seattle, WA).
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tive justification for a fact-finding role on the part of any court of
first instance, such as the WTO panels, even within an adversarial
framework. Leaving aside the use of the jury, which persists in
some justice systems, any trial level court must necessarily make
determinations of the truth or validity of facts upon which legal
claims are based just as an appellate court will make rulings of law.
But appellate judges do not merely take submissions on the law
from the parties to the dispute and weigh them against each other;
instead, they conduct their own research by consulting textbooks,
case law, and statutes to arrive at their own conclusions, which are
colored as they should be by the legal arguments presented by
counsel. Some, if not most of this legal research is conducted by
others, viz trained legal clerks, usually recent law graduates who
are in the direct employ of individual judges for that purpose.
Thus by analogy, trial judges should be able to use independent
fact-finding specialists to compliment litigants' disclosure to the
extent that it is incomplete or not credible. Surely it is preferential
for judges to ascertain additional facts to illuminate their under-
standing of evidence presented at trial rather than rely solely upon
extrapolation from facts already in their possession, which would
exacerbate the already dangerously subjective doctrine of judicial
notice.31
Although we have seen above that the Appellate Body has
taken a liberal view of the panel's right to seek information, the
Appellate Body has also voiced concern as to the limits of that
right: "[a] panel is entitled to seek information and advice from
experts and from any other relevant source it chooses... to help it
to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the argu-
ments made by the parties, but not to make a case for a complain-
ing party."32 The Appellate Body cautioned that questions directed
to the parties do not "overstep the bounds of legitimate manage-
ment or guidance of the proceedings.., in the interest of efficiency
and dispatch."33 This may mean that panels' questions should not
relieve the complainant of its burden of establishing the inconsis-
31 See Sward, supra note 29, at 6-9 (discussing the importance of appellate
courts' role in culling the abuse of judicial discretion in lower courts).
32 Appellate Body Report, Japan -Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
129, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1999).
33 Panel Report, Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections
of Iron or Non-alloy Steel and H-beams from Poland, 7.50, WT/DS122/R (Sept. 28,
2000).
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tency of the respondent's measures, 34 but it is unlikely that it
means the panel should not even identify gaps in the factual record
that necessitate further investigation. It seems most likely that the
Appellate Body simply intended that the panel's inquisitive role
should operate within a reasonable limit. Such a limit can be
found in the principle of non ultra petita: a judge can only examine
the claims that are put before it. Although identifying factual defi-
ciencies is a different matter from rectifying them through proac-
tive investigation, this second action should be permissible pro-
vided that the investigation is apposite to the specific allegations
made by the parties in their submissions. Thus, the more detailed
an allegation, the more likely evidence will be sought relating to it.
It has been further suggested that the panel should either engage in
fact-finding or refuse to do so depending on whether the legal is-
sue to which the facts apply is seen as central to the overall dis-
pute. Accordingly, if a party concedes a particular fact, there is less
need for the panel to make an independent inquiry into it, and if a
question remains unanswered, even if a party chooses not to pre-
sent any specific arguments for or against it, it clearly remains
open to the panel to investigate.35 Beyond these guiding principles,
the nature of the directions given to the investigatory body and the
use given to the information it gathers will depend on the circum-
stances of each case.
Another key limitation on judicial fact-finding is the need for
impartiality in order to avoid an apprehension of bias. Separation
is required between fact-gathering and decision-making or else ob-
jectivity is threatened. This is precisely the reason why missing in-
formation should be obtained by a third party at the behest of
judges rather than by the judges themselves; the decision-makers
are insulated from any potential taint that could be engendered
during the investigative process, such as closeness or sympathy to
the individuals involved. There is also a practical advantage in the
separation of investigation from decision: institutionalized fact-
finding would obviate problems, such as the lack of time available
to part-time panelists and their location outside the countries
where the facts originate.36 Additional benefits and problems asso-
ciated with a fact-finding body within the WTO will now be con-
sidered.
34 WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 543.
35 Id. at 546.
36 OESCH, supra note 2, at 57.
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5. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A WTO FACT-FINDING BODY
The first clear justification for the existence of a fact-finding
body within the WTO is evident in instances of resource inequality
between the parties to a dispute. As suggested above, many de-
veloping nations cannot finance the collection of evidence to sup-
port their allegations and consequently could benefit from assis-
tance from the WTO itself in this area. Concern for the trading
needs of developing countries is a central feature of the DSU, re-
flecting the recognition that trade disputes in such nations can
have wide-reaching effects in which lives could be lost.37 Such
procedural inequality between parties to WTO disputes was ac-
knowledged when the Appellate Body granted a developing na-
tion the use of outside counsel because it could not afford perma-
nent trade law experts.38 It has been recommended that DSB
intervention at the informal consultation stage may redress asym-
metrical resources.39 Concern for procedural fairness reflects the
public dimension of the WTO DSB, which does not adjudicate pri-
vate actions but rather disputes between sovereign states.
As noted in Section 2, a significant problem associated with
fact-gathering by Members has been that of non-cooperation from
parties, on whose goodwill fact collection often depends.40 For ex-
ample, in the recent softwood lumber dispute, the United States
complained to a WTO panel that the International Trade Commis-
sion's (ITC) efforts to gather information regarding softwood lum-
ber subsidization were obstructed by Canadian producers. 41 Such
non-cooperation may well have been avoided if neutral WTO
agents had been conducting the investigation rather than those
representing a foreign state. This is because WTO agents would be
seen as unbiased and, therefore, non-threatening to the interests of
that state.
In a similar fashion, institutionalized fact-finding would dem-
37 See, e.g., supra note 3, DSU art. 4 10, art. 8 10, art. 12 11.
38 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 5, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
39 See Pauwelyn, supra note 30, at 134 (nothing that the assistance of an objec-
tive mediator in the consultation stage might help with fact-finding or settlement).
40 OEscH, supra note 2, at 57.
41 Softwood Lumber Investigation, supra note 1, 4.282. For another recent ex-
ample of alleged non-cooperation in fact-gathering, see e.g., Panel Report, United
States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Com-
munities, 7.68, WT/DS212/RW (Aug. 17, 2005).
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onstrate the significance of the interests at stake to the parties-
possibly to third parties as well, in the case of amicus curiae briefs-
as it would embody the WTO's commitment to the factual integrity
of the dispute settlement process. This factual integrity cannot be
over-valued as it is vital to the bestowal of legitimacy on WTO de-
cisions. This is not to suggest that fact-finding conducted by do-
mestic authorities like the ITC is inherently flawed or biased.
However, a panel decision based on facts obtained by a neutral
agency would have greater perceived validity than one based upon
facts obtained by the parties themselves, even though those facts
are subject to subsequent independent evaluation of the panel un-
der an objective reasonableness standard. This procedural weak-
ness in the current system may be one explanation for Canada's
disregard for the ITC's fact-finding methodology in the recent
softwood lumber panel decision. Canada might well have de-
clared its intention to appeal the panel's ruling42 based, as it was,
on the ITC's submissions, had this evidence been obtained by an
arm of the WTO rather than by their opponents in the dispute.
John Jackson argues that augmented legitimacy of WTO panel
decisions would assist with compliance.43 Addressing fact-finding
in particular, Manley Hudson similarly wrote in 1937:
[A]n international tribunal cannot ignore the possible use-
fulness of such procedure, not only for ensuring that results
will be arrived at on the basis of the fullest possible infor-
mation, but also for creating that support in public opinion
which is the one sure sanction of its judgments. 44
Indeed, as Bassiouni remarked, some fact-finding missions are
"designed to simply show responsiveness to public outcry in cer-
42 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada to
Appeal WVTO Panel's Conclusion on Softwood Lumber, News Release no. 216 (Nov. 15,
2005), available at http://wOl.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp? publi-
cationjid=383399 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
43 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 160 (2000). Although some have noted
that the WVTO has been a success in terms of compliance. See, e.g., Chi Carmody,
Remedies and Conformity under the WATO Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ECON L. 307, 309 (2002)
("[T]he corrective aim of WTO remedies is not to compensate the victim, but to
induce the wrongdoer to comply."); Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, VTO Dispute
Settlement 1995-2002: A Statistical Analysis, 6 J. INT'L ECON L. 251, 260 (2003) (re-
viewing a large number of requests for panels to decide whether recommenda-
tions have been properly implemented).
44 Hudson, supra note 24, at 697.
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tain egregious situations. In these cases they are more akin to pub-
lic relations missions."45 Thus the very presence of a WTO investi-
gation team within a state's territory might reduce tensions such
that harsh retaliation through countervailing duties or other such
measures would not be necessary. It is unlikely that the investiga-
tors would be viewed as an intrusion given that they would repre-
sent the global community, be appointed by the Member States
and would partially consist of their own nationals (as will be sug-
gested in Section 7). As the process of WTO adjudication itself can
be key to restricting harmful trade practices prior to the issuance of
a ruling, the gravitas of a fact-finding mission authorized by the
WTO would emphasize the need to modify trade practices and in-
duce concessions between Members before a formal sanction is
imposed. Moreover, panel reliance on facts revealed by third party
investigation allows a Member State to accept compromise in a
face-saving manner that would not be politically feasible were the
panel's ruling based on facts unearthed and presented exclusively
by the opponents or perhaps worse, by an agency appointed under
its own authority. This is the essence of the advantage to adjudica-
tion before a multi-lateral dispute body like the WTO.
6. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A WTO FACT-FINDING BODY
There are various other criticisms that could be directed at the
notion of a dedicated fact-finding body within the WTO and these
will now be considered in turn. Firstly, institutional fact-finding at
the WTO might be seen as unnecessary given the nature of the evi-
dence with which the panels are confronted. As most WTO dis-
putes involve assessment of measures undertaken by Member
governments, it is the text of the measure itself which normally
composes the factual foundation of panel proceedings, which tend
to consist primarily of legal argument regarding those measures,
rather than evaluation of particular facts.46 While this statement
may have been accurate at one time, it is less apt today. Increas-
ingly complex questions such as the assessment of the threat of in-
jury from subsidization necessitate the evaluation of facts, such as
export, price, and production figures47 and this demands the assis-
45 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice - Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 35, 45 (2001).
46 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 11, at 116.
47 See Softwood Lumber Investigation, supra note 1 (finding a substantial in-
crease in softwood lumber imports from Canada both imminent and likely).
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tance of investigators with some familiarity with the nature of the
data with which they are confronted. Fact-gathering could also be
crucial where the panel is required to make determinations of envi-
ronmental exemptions, 48 or regarding financial services 49 and intel-
lectual property5 0 obligations, issues which are becoming more
common at the WTO.
Enhanced fact-finding capability at the panel stage could frus-
trate the consultation process. Consultations have been successful
in achieving pre-panel settlement in part because of their open at-
mosphere and confidentiality. Consequently, some have expressed
concern that increased formality at the consultation stage, such as
pressure for full factual disclosure, could diminish that forum's
ability to facilitate settlement.51 Emphasizing the importance of the
limited evidentiary rigor in the consultation phase of WTO dispute
settlement, Gary Horlick and Glenn Butterton commented em-
phatically: "[the] ideal degree of disclosure by the parties...
seem[s] to be at odds with the spirit, if not the letter, of the WTO
dispute resolution process."52 The Appellate Body disagrees, stat-
ing that all parties should fully disclose the facts on which their
claims are based from the point of consultation onwards. 53 Despite
that direction, it is advisable that in order to retain the potential for
resolution derived from the more relaxed consultation stage, the
48 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. XX(b) [hereinafter GATT Agreement] ("nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health").
49 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, Legal Instru-
ments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
50 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
51 Gary N. Horlick, The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private
Practitioner's View, in 32 INT'L LAW. 685, 686 (1998).
52 Gary N. Horlick & Glenn R. Butterton, A Problem of Process in WATO Juris-
prudence: Identifying Disputed Issues in Panels and Consultations, 31 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 573, 580 (2000).
53 Appellate Body India -Patents, supra note 16, at 94. This remark has not
resulted in significant fact-finding at the consultation stage, but some commenta-
tors believe that this may encourage panels to exercise their existing fact-finding
powers more assertively in later stages of proceedings. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS,
supra note 11, at 90-91.
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fact-finding agency should only be available once a formal panel
proceeding has begun.
Maintaining a fact-finding agency and conducting prolonged
investigations throughout the world could be expensive. John
Jackson has warned that "[a] serious and prolonged fact-type hear-
ing could easily bankrupt the resource allocation to the WTO dis-
pute settlement system."54 In contrast, James Bacchus has ob-
served that the WTO's budget is already small in global terms-
only $80 million annually; 5 therefore additional costs resulting
from fact-finding would hardly justify abandoning the project.
Availability of an improved evidentiary record would assist in
identifying and correcting benefit impairments under the WTO
agreements, and the resulting maximization in world trade would
compensate for the cost of financing the fact-finding body borne by
individual Members (as reflected in their contributions to the
WTO).
Expanded fact-finding powers of the WTO DSB might be per-
ceived by Members as a further threat to sovereignty as guaranteed
under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, in that such powers could in-
terfere in sensitive areas of domestic jurisdiction.
A stricter standard of review for factual determinations by
Member States, such as correctness rather than objective assess-
ment would be intrusive enough 6 without the further probing that
would be associated with de novo fact-finding. However, this view
is not compelling because WTO Members have already surren-
dered a degree of sovereignty by virtue of their consent to WTO
Membership. It is difficult to imagine that fact-finding within a
Member States' borders would further exacerbate the concern for
sovereignty because investigations seem an aspect of self-
government, and therefore less intrusive, than to sanctions at the
hands of the DSB - albeit that DSB conclusions merely have the
status of recommendations. Fact-finding by its nature concerns
process - such as in the maintaining of complete, accurate and ac-
cessible records -and accordingly does not directly challenge sub-
54 JACKSON, supra note 8, at 92.
55 The United States contributes only a "pittance" of $15 million out of this
$80 million. James Bacchus, A Few Thoughts On Legitimacy, Democracy and the
WTO in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 429, 430 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & James Harrison
eds., 2005).
56 Zleptnig, supra note 4, at 5 (recounting the Appellate Body's "objective as-
sessment" standard of review).
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stantive issues of policy or the purpose behind government pro-
grams, such as the promotion of a particular industry or sector of
the economy; therefore any intercession into sovereignty is more
symbolic than actual. Any perceived sacrifice of a Member's
autonomy would also be mitigated by that the fact-finding was
done fairly and without bias against particular Member States.
This could be achieved by Member States playing a strong role in
the establishment and composition of the body itself, as discussed
in the next section.
There may be concern that expanded fact-finding powers for
the WTO might reduce parties' willingness to provide the requisite
information under Article 13.1 and thus might paradoxically lead
to less information. Rather than suffer the cost burden of conduct-
ing its own investigations, a party might be motivated to let the
fact-finding body obtain the information. This would be permissi-
ble in the case of a developing nation unable to afford its own in-
vestigation, but not as a less-expensive alternative to a Member
State that could have obtained the information on its own. How-
ever, this eventuality is unlikely. Despite the foregoing suggestion
that sovereignty would not be threatened by fact-finding, it is safe
to assume that Members would still prefer to conduct their own
investigations both for purposes of confidentiality and also because
of their perception that fact-finding by their own domestic agencies
would tend to yield information that is more favorable to the
Member's case.
Fact-finding at the WTO could arguably be left for arbitration
as provided by Article 25 of the DSU. However, as Pauwelyn has
observed, the arbitration route is unlikely to be used with any fre-
quency because of the multilateral nature of trade disputes and
also because there is no appeal mechanism. 5 7 The important fea-
ture of appeal is one of the reasons that Member States are placing
increased reliance on the WTO DSB to handle a wide range of
trade-related disputes. Fact-finding power should be inserted into
this mechanism for maximum efficiency leaving the successful
less-formal arbitration stage intact.
One could contend that any benefits derived from WTO fact-
finding could be achieved through ad hoc investigation, similar to
how most expert advice is currently sought by the WVTO. The first
problem with this is that the use of temporary agencies would not
57 Pauwelyn, supra note 30, at 138 ("[N]o appeal is possible in an Article 25
arbitration.").
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convey the aforementioned symbolic importance that a standing
body would. Second, ad hoc fact-finding bodies, such as those that
have been used by the UN Security Council involving human
rights violations, have been criticized for their lack of organization
which inhibits their objectivity and effectiveness.5 8 Efficiency en-
gendered by standardization could be achieved by a standing body
of investigators with an established procedure for finding, docu-
menting, and reporting. Still, rather than create its own investiga-
tive agency, it might be more prudent for the WTO to make use of
a fact-finding body of another organization, such as one commis-
sioned by the UN Security Council, which might arguably achieve
the same demonstrative legitimacy of a dedicated WTO panel with
less expense. Of course the Security Council's mandate only per-
mits it to take action if there is a threat to the peace,59 which would
not normally be relevant to trade issues.60 The primary problem
here is that an ad hoc body or one belonging to another interna-
tional organization, such as the UN, might not have the requisite
expertise in trade-related matters. It is conceivable that the WTO's
standing investigatory agency could be shared by the IMF or pos-
sibly by the UN Security Council, when evaluating the latter or-
ganization's need to resort to economic sanction.
61
7. THE WTO BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
The form that the WTO fact-finding agency would take, which
has been mentioned in brief throughout this article, will now be
reviewed and discussed. The best model for the WTO investiga-
tive body would consist of a team of individuals appointed equally
by and representative of WTO Member States to avoid the appre-
hension of bias. WTO investigators would possess qualifications
58 Bassiuni, supra note 45, at 40 (noting that there is no standardized fact-
finding procedure even after fifty years).
59 U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Ar-
ticles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
60 Notably, stronger cooperation between the WTO and UN agencies has al-
ready been recommended regarding evaluations of intellectual property and na-
tional policy exceptions. Gary P. Sampson, Is There a Need for Restructuring the Col-
laboration Among WTO and UN Agencies So As to Harness Their Complementarities?, 7
J. INT'L ECON. L. 717, 726 (2004) (concluding the many areas of common concern
should cause WTO and UN agencies to make more efforts at collaboration).
61 U.N. Charter art. 41 (allowing the Security Council to impose partial inter-
ruption of economic relations).
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necessary to find and collect economic and other trade-related
data. While they would not need to be qualified to the level of ex-
perts, relevant backgrounds in forensic accounting, law or econom-
ics would be preferable. Document review paralegals also known
as project lawyers, which are used with increasing frequency by
large law firms to assist with documentary discovery requirements
in complex files, would be suitable candidates for this role because
of their attention to detail and familiarity with locating key evi-
dence within massive amounts of documentation. Individuals
with police training would be helpful to deal with recalcitrant in-
dividuals who may obstruct the fact-gathering process and also to
conduct on-site inspections, perhaps of factories, warehouses, or
other industrial plants. Such investigations would be particularly
relevant to issues of dumping and subsidization. The need for po-
lice-type powers (which may involve searching private premises)
demonstrate the public character of WTO dispute settlement which
affects the rights of all citizens, not just the private concerns of the
industries involved. Investigators would not consist of govern-
ment employees because this might increase the likelihood of a
conflict of interest with respect to the state which appointed them,
particularly were an agent were to engage in fact-finding within
his own state. As WTO investigators' mandate would be at the be-
hest of the parties and the panel judges (in keeping with the con-
sent-based nature of international dispute settlement), their activi-
ties would not be covert. Such a mandate might undermine the
legitimacy of WTO DSB decisions and ultimately hinder compli-
ance. WTO investigators would not be spies, and, as such, FBI
agents would be reasonable model.
To avoid the problems associated with the ad hoc fact-finding
missions of the UN, the WTO investigative team would operate
under an established code of procedure that outlines the extent of
their powers and duties. First, it would be important that investi-
gators would not offer conclusions but simply find and present the
facts to the panel as revealed, enabling judges to arrive upon their
own conclusions. Second, it would be important for each WTO
Member State to grant investigators the same authority that do-
mestic law enforcement possesses, particularly since most WTO
disputes involve to a large degree the trading activities of private
entities rather than government bodies. Domestic constitutional
oversight over the exercise of these powers would ensure that
rights were not infringed upon during fact-finding and also mini-
mize encroachment upon Members' sovereignty in the field of civil
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rights. Third, procedure must be established for the format and
timing for presentation of the agency's evidence to the WTO pan-
els. Given the fairly strict chronology of the dispute settlement
framework, additional time should be allocated to facilitate the in-
vestigator's role in proceedings at the panel stage. The panel has
stated that parties should wait until the first written submission be-
fore they make a request to the panel to seek information, which
would accord the panel sufficient time to ascertain the nature of
the additional data that might need to be obtained. 62 Accordingly,
the investigatory body should not be deployed until after the first
submissions. Unlike the current regime, the investigatory body
would be under an obligation to disclose any information gathered
to the Member State from which that information is obtained. The
Member State would then have the opportunity to modify its
stance or rectify its trade practices without need for a panel ruling
which would foster settlement. This "sharing of information"
would also contribute to the image of the investigatory body as one
of collaboration and assistance which would, in turn, engender co-
operation.
8. CONCLUSION
Although the agreements which constituted the WTO DSU
contemplate the production of new evidence to the panels upon
request of the parties, the organization currently has no de novo
fact-finding mandate on its own motion. But because this function
is not unknown to international dispute settlement, that knowl-
edge may be extended to WTO panels. This article has accordingly
proposed the establishment of a standing fact-finding body within
the WTO to seek information which might rectify omissions in the
evidence submitted by parties. This function is in keeping with the
inquisitive model of international tribunals which emphasizes ne-
gotiation. However, caution must be exercised that the WTO's
fact-finding power is not taken too far. Accordingly, the panel
must not use evidence obtained from the investigators to make a
party's case for them and any information sought must relate to
specific allegations from the parties. As it would not reach its own
conclusions or make recommendations, the fact-finding agency
62 Report of the Panel, Canada -Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Air-
craft, 9.83, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) (noting that the Panel could find in favor
of Brazil without Canada entering a defense).
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would not compromise essential judicial impartiality.
Institutionalized fact-finding would enhance the WTO's ability
to resolve international trade disputes, most notably by neutraliz-
ing the disadvantage to developing nations and by increasing the
legitimacy of decisions, ultimately leading to better compliance. In
addition to these practical advantages, it seems impossible to argue
that it is not always preferable for an adjudicating body to have op-
timal knowledge of the facts before them. The more complete the
evidence, the closer the proximity to the truth and therefore the
stronger likelihood that justice will be done when the law is ap-
plied. This is the essential goal of institutionalized decision-
making and one of the primary reasons why sovereign parties
choose to place their trust in international tribunals. Failure to es-
tablish as complete an evidentiary record as reasonably possible
through the assistance of a fact-finding body would therefore un-
dermine the credibility of the WTO as an organization that seeks to
promote judicious resolution of international disputes.
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